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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze cases where consumers are aware of the exis-
tence of two qualities but do not know which ﬁrm sells the good one. We
show that if the production of the high quality requires higher cost, its
producer may be severly disadvantaged, even if the additional utility fully
justiﬁes the extra cost. We even show cases where all consumers beliefs are
in favour of the eﬃcient high quality producer, yet it is its ineﬃcient rival
that monopolizes the market! This result explains the slow penetration of
some credence goods like environementally friendly products, organic veg-
etables, etc. It also makes an urgent call for labelling this kind of products.
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11 Introduction
In many instances consumers are aware of the existence of two qualities but
do not know which ﬁrm sells the good one. While repeated purchases and word-
of-mouth can in some cases solve the problem (experience goods)1 in others the
consumer cannot tell the quality she has purchased even after consuming the
good (credence goods).2 Consider the case of organic produces versus fertilizer
produced ones. The latter are accused for harmful long term health eﬀects of
which the former are supposed to be free. Consumers may be aware of the
existence of the two types of produce as well as of their health properties, yet they
can rarely tell the organic produce even after consumption. As another example,
consider two goods that are similar with respect to their physical characteristics
but diﬀer with respect to their “moral” ones: one is harmful to the environment
while the other is not, one is produced by an “ethically correct” ﬁrm while the
other by a pure proﬁt maximizer, etc. Both organic and moral goods are high
quality types of credence goods, with the sole diﬀerence that in the former quality
is consisted of private beneﬁts, while in the latter the consumer internalizes an
externality (partly or fully).
In this paper, we analyze market conditions for this kind of products based on
a duopoly model inspired on the work of Gabszewicz and Grilo (1992), published
in this journal, hereafter GG. Consumers are similar in their tastes but have
diﬀering beliefs on how trustworthy each ﬁrm is. Contrary to GG, we assume
that production of the higher quality requires higher marginal costs and call
“eﬃcient” the ﬁrm whose product yields the higher net surplus (after subtracting
1Furthermore, with the experience goods the market can set signals: price distortion
(Shapiro, 1983 a,b), advertising (Tirole, 1988) or warranties (Palfrey and Romer, 1983).
2For the diﬀerence between experience goods and credence goods, the reader can see Nelson
(1970) and Darby and Karni (1973).
2marginal cost). When all consumers attribute a probability higher than .5t oa
single ﬁrm as being the high quality producer, we say that that ﬁrm is trusted.
We show that under incomplete information the low quality producer has
an advantage. When the two ﬁrms are equally eﬃcient the market outcome is
either monopoly of the low quality or duopoly, the high quality surviving only
when there is suﬃcient dispersion of beliefs.3 Surprisingly, this holds true even
when the high quality is the trusted ﬁrm. When, on the other hand, the eﬃcient
ﬁrm is the high quality, a monopoly of the ineﬃcient low quality still cannot be
excluded, even when the eﬃcient high quality is the trusted ﬁrm! These rather
surprising results have a lemons ﬂavor: the presence of the low quality prevents
the high quality producer from ripping all the beneﬁts generated by its product.
They help explain the slow penetration of organic vegetables, environmentally
friendly products, and other “moral” goods. They also make an urgent call for
the introduction of credible labels.
2 The model
A s s u m et w ov e r s i o n so fap r o d u c t ,ah i g hq u a l i t yt y p e( t y p eh)a n dal o w
quality type (type l), produced at constant marginal costs cj, j = h,l, respec-
tively, with ch >c l.A l l ﬁxed costs are zero and, without loss of generality, we
normalize cl = 0. All consumers buy one unit of the product or none at all and
derive utility Uj > 0, j = h,l with Uh >U l. Each type of product is produced by
ad i ﬀerent ﬁrm i and sold at price pi, i =1 ,2. We assume that the high quality
is produced by ﬁrm 2, so U2 = Uh,c 2 = ch and U1 = Ul,c 1 = cl.
All consumers have identical tastes given by:




V = Ui − pi,i = 1, 2, if they purchase from ﬁrm i,
V =0 ,o t h e r w i s e .
Prices are expressed in terms of a Hicksian num´ eraire. If both products are
oﬀered at equal prices, under full information all consumers buy from ﬁrm 2. If,
on the other hand, both products are oﬀered at prices reﬂecting marginal costs
consumers favor unanimously ﬁrm 2 (ﬁrm 1) when r ≡ ∆/(c2−c1) > (<)1, where
∆ ≡ Uh − Ul; ﬁrm 2 (ﬁrm 1) is then called the eﬃcient ﬁrm. Firms set prices
simultaneously (Bertrand competition).
We assume that consumers are a) aware of the existence of two qualities, b)
aware of the exact product characteristics,4 c) totally ignorant about production
costs, d) able to identify whether a product is made by ﬁrm 1 or 2, and e)
uncertain about which ﬁrm sells the high quality.5 With respect to the latter,
they form subjective probabilities based on all available information, including
word-of-mouth. The health consequences of consuming non-organic products
taking long time to be revealed, in the absence of trusting labels no consumer
can tell the good from the bad quality even after consuming the good.
Ac o n s u m e ri si d e n t i ﬁed by a subjective probability α ∈ [0,1] she assigns to
event E:“ ﬁrm 1 sells the high quality product and ﬁrm 2 sells the low quality
one”. The more important α is, the wider is the trust between the given consumer
and ﬁrm 1 and of course, the weaker is the trust between that consumer and ﬁrm
2. We assume the consumer population distributed over a set of probabilities
S =[ α,α], with 0 ≤ α < α ≤ 1, according to a uniform distribution with density
(α − α)−1. W ea s s u m et h a tw h i l eﬁrms know perfectly the domain of beliefs,
4I.e., they perfectly know the consequences of consuming the high or the low quality.
5In our analysis consumers are certain that both product types are available in the market.
Allowing consumers to assess positive probabilities to the events that only one product type
(high or low quality) is sold by both ﬁrms complicates the analysis without adding anything
signiﬁcant to the results.
4consumers do not, so, in conjunction with assumption c) above, prices cannot
signal quality. When 1/2 > α (< α) we say that all consumers trust ﬁrm 2 (ﬁrm
1). When 1/2 ∈ S, consumer trust is split between the two ﬁrms.
Favoring a ﬁrm does not necessarily mean buying from it, since the actual
choice depends on relative prices, as well. The expected utility a consumer α
derives from consuming a product is: 


αUh +( 1− α)Ul − p1 for good 1, and
(1 − α)Uh + αUl − p2 for good 2.
At equal prices, the consumer indiﬀerent between the two products is the one
with αu =1 /2. Depending on whether 1/2 ∈ (/ ∈)S the model is reminiscent of
horizontal (vertical) diﬀerentiation. One needs of course to keep in mind that in
this context diﬀerentiation does not stem from product characteristics—which are
unobservable—but from beliefs. Thus, it may well be that for some set of beliefs,
all consumers favor (erroneously) ﬁrm 1. Investigating the formation of beliefs
lies outside the scope of this paper. Instead, we consider beliefs as exogenous and
investigate their inﬂuence on market structure.
At given prices, the consumer αm just indiﬀerent between the two products








We assume that in equilibrium the market is fully covered, sales are, therefore,
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≡ f(α) while for D2 > 0i st h a tα > 2α − 1
2(1 − 1
r) ≡ g(α),
with r ≡ ∆/c2 (see Appendix). Let e α be such that f(e α)=g(e α). It can be easily
shown that e α = 1
2 − 1
2r < 1/2a n dt h a tf(e α)=e α. Since e α is on the 450 line
and α > α, α cannot be smaller than both f(α)a n dg(α). When α = α = e α
all consumers have identical beliefs and their beliefs are such as to leave them
5indiﬀerent between the two products oﬀered at marginal cost. The position of e α
depends on r.W h e nr>1 (the high quality is the eﬃcient ﬁrm), 0 < e α ≤ 1/2,
while for r<1, e α < 0; the two situations are depicted in ﬁgures 1 and 2, for
r =2a n dr =2 /3, respectively.
Lemma 1 The Nash equilibrium of the price game is
a) For α > max{f(α),g(α)}, p1 =
(2(2α−α)−1)∆+c2
3 , p2 =
(2(α−2α)+1)∆+2c2
3 ,
with D1,D 2 > 0;
b) For α < α ≤ f(α),p 2 =( 1− 2α)∆ with D2 =1while ∀p1,D 1 =0 ;
c) For α < α ≤ g(α),p 1 =( 2 α − 1)∆ + c2 with D1 =1while ∀p2,D 2 =0 .
Proof. See appendix.
The propositions below are corollaries of Lemma 1.
Proposition 1: when r ∈ {1,+∞),
the set Ω = {S : α < 1/2, D1 > 0, D2 ≥ 0}6 = ∅ ;
Proof. (see ﬁgure 1): Note that g0(α) > 1 >f 0(α), so ∀α > e α,g (α) > α >
f(α). Also, for 1 ≤ r<+∞, 0 ≤ e α < 1/2. Consequently for e α < α < 1/2, D1 is
always superior to 0 (i.e. α >f(α)) and D2 can be superior to 0 (i.e. α >g (α))
or nul α <g (α).
In ﬁgure 1, where the high quality is the eﬃcient ﬁrm, we distinguish three
zones according to diﬀerent (α,α) pairs: in the dark zone the equilibrium struc-
ture is monopoly of the high quality ﬁrm, in the medium gray zone monopoly of
the low quality ﬁrm and in the light gray zone duopoly. The spread of beliefs
must be suﬃciently wide in order to provide a duopolistic competition. This
result is similar to the one obtained in GG.
Proposition 1 states that all consumers having a gutfeeling in the right direc-
tion (i.e. α < 1/2) may not be suﬃcient to eliminate an ineﬃcient low quality.
Even worse, we note instances where the ineﬃcient low quality may monopolize
the market, despite the fact that consumers unanimously trust its rival. This
6happens when e α < α < 1/2a n dα <g (α), which is equivalent to all consumers
having a gutfeeling pointing to the right direction but not being certain enough
to pay the price diﬀerence necessary for the high quality to be produced (see
crosshatched zone in ﬁgure 1).
In the GG analysis, since both qualities are produced at similar costs, r →
+∞, and therefore e α → 1/2. Thus, in GG the situation of the two ﬁrms with
respect to consumer beliefs is symmetric and no ﬁrm can monopolize the market
u n l e s si ti st r u s t e db ya l lc o n s u m e r s .T h i si m p l i e st h a ta sl o n ga sa tl e a s ts o m e
consumer’s gutfeelings point to ﬁrm 2 as being the high quality producer, this
ﬁrm cannot be eliminated from the market. B ya l l o w i n gf o rc o s td i ﬀerences we
show that the high quality is at disadvantage (e α < 1/2) for any ﬁnite value of r.
This disadvantage can be so large that in some cases ﬁrm 2 is eliminated from
the market even when all consumers trust it more than its rival.6
Notice also a curiosum between the sets of beliefs S1 and S2 in ﬁgure 1: under
S2 all consumers’ beliefs are more correct, yet the outcome is less eﬃcient! This
is due to the fact that the narrower dispersion under S2 turns competition into
a cut-throat one and unless gutfeelings favour strongly ﬁrm 2, the latter can be
eliminated. This calls for great care in the design of any policy that only partially
improves consumers’ perception and may constitute an argument in favour of the
adoption of labels instead.7,8
6I.e., when all consumers attribute more than .5 probability to ﬁrm 2 being the high quality
producer.
7Advertising and/or publications from third parties (consumer protection agencies, newpa-
pers, etc.) are examples of measures that improve beliefs but do not restore full information,
since they neither the entire population, no are trusted equally by all consumers. We refrain
from assessing the results of such policies since we have not endogenize the formation of beliefs.
The result in the text should be, therefore, considered simply as a comparative statics one.
8We assume that public labels are readily available upon a product’s purchase and fully
trusted (an assumption that may not be appropriate in cases where the regulator has been
7Proposition 2: when 0 <r≤ 1, a) ∀S, D1 > 0;b )∀α > 1/2, D2 =0 .
Proof. (see ﬁgure 2): When r ≤ 1t h e ne α ≤ 0, so ∀α ∈ [0,1], g(α) >
α >f (α). For part b) note that g(α =0 .5,r=1 )=1a n d∂g(·)/∂r<0,
∂g(·)/∂α > 0. This implies that ∀r<1a n d∀α > 1/2, α < 1 <g (α)a n dt h e
market share of ﬁrm 2 vanishes, Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 states that when the low quality is the eﬃcient ﬁrm, a) it can
never be eliminated from the market (in ﬁgure 2 the dark zone disappears), and b)
the high quality must be trusted at least by some consumers in order to survive.
When r<1 the introduction of a label confers the entire market to ﬁrm 1,
yet its price and proﬁts are lower than they would be in the duopoly situation!9
This happens because the presence of a higher quality allows ﬁr m1t o“ c r e a m ”
consumers with high α by pretending to be the high quality producer. It also
explains why r<1 does not induce self-revelation of the low quality. Thus, even
if the taste for organic products it is not suﬃciently developed (r<1), false
organic products may enter the market. The introduction of a label redistributes
welfare from ﬁrms to consumers and is expected to face unanimous opposition
from both ﬁrms.10
When the beneﬁts associated with the high quality are strictly private and
r<1, the monopoly of ﬁrm 1 is obviously desirable. This could be the case with
organic products that reduce health risk disproportionately little relative to their
cost. Consider, however, the case where the organic good is not appreciated for its
“captured”). Moreover, we have ruled out all practical impedements in the implementation of
the labels.
9In complete information the monopoly price and proﬁto fﬁrm 1 is always inferior to the
monopoly price and proﬁt of one in incomplete information and consequently to duopoly proﬁt.
It is easy to demonstrate that when α >g (α) duopoly price is superior to price in complete
information.
10The label increases consumer welfare even when it does not change market structure, since
it lowers ﬁrm 1’s price.
8health—hence private—beneﬁts but for its environmental impact.11 In this case, the
consumer may internalize only part of the negative externality her consumption
causes, so we may well have rs > 1 >r ,w h e r ers is deﬁn e di na na n a l o g o u s
way with r, but using the diﬀerence in social—instead of private—utilities in the
numerator. The informational problem increases the survival chances and the
eventual market share of the organic product, the use of label when the organic
product is privately ineﬃcient can therefore be harmful.12
3C o n c l u s i o n
We show that consumers are uncertain about the identity of the ﬁrm that
produces the high quality, the high quality producer is at disadvantage due to
his higher cost, even if the private beneﬁts of its product are well worth the cost
diﬀerence. Our model explains the slow penetration of some credence goods — like
environmentally friendly products, organic vegetables, etc. —in an environment
without public labels.
When the high quality is privately eﬃcient the market outcome may not be
eﬃcient even when all consumer’s gutfeelings point to the right direction. A label
restores full social optimum but may induce higher prices for the high quality.
When the low quality is both privately and socially eﬃcient a label increases
total welfare while it redistributes welfare from producer to consumer. When the
high quality is socially but not privately eﬃcient, the label still reduces prices
(redistribution in favour of consumers) but may in some cases induce ineﬃcient
outcomes.
11Even from a strict health point of view there may be externalities since in most countries
at least part of the cost of health is public.
12This is a typical second best result where two distortions may be better than one.
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Figure 2: The partition of equilibria when r=2/3.
11Appendix:
With the marginal consumer we obtain the following demand functions :
• If p2 ≤ p1 − (2α − 1)∆ ⇐⇒ αm ≥ α,
then D1(p1,p 2)=0a n dD2(p1,p 2)=1 .
• If p2 +( 2 α − 1)∆ <p 1 <p 2 +( 2 α − 1)∆ ⇐⇒ α < αm < α,














• If p2 ≥ p1 − (2α − 1)∆ ⇐⇒ αm ≤ α,
then D1(p1,p 2)=1a n dD2(p1,p 2)=0 .
Recall that the market is assumed to be fully covered, which implies Uh+Ul ≥
p1 + p2.
Maximizing ﬁrm 1’s proﬁtw eg e tt h a tﬁrm’s best reply function:
• if p2 > (2(α − 2α)+1 ) ∆ the duopoly proﬁto fﬁrm 1 is inferior to its
monopoly proﬁt, then ﬁrm 1 sets the highest price that keeps ﬁrm 2 out of
the market : p1 =( 2 α − 1)∆ + p2,
• if ∆(1−2α) <p 2 < (2(α−2α)+1)∆ the duopoly proﬁto fﬁrm 1 is superior
to its monopoly proﬁt, then ﬁrm 1 sets its best reply to p2 that guarantees








• if p2 < ∆(1 − 2α) ﬁrm 1 can not have positive proﬁts and drops out the
market, ﬁrm 1 sets: p1 = c1 =0 .
Similarly, the best response function for ﬁrm 2 is:
12• if p1 > (2(2α − α) − 1)∆ + c2 then ﬁrm 2 sets p2 =( 1− 2α)∆ + p1,









• if p1 < ∆(2α − 1) + c2 then ﬁrm 2 sets: p2 = c2.
Using both ﬁrms’ best response functions we determine the Nash equilibrium
of the game.
• When both ﬁrms have positive market shares in equibrium, equilibrium
prices and quantities are:13
p1 =
(2(2α−α)−1)∆+c2









π1 =( 2 ( α − α)∆)(D1)
2 > 0a n dπ2 =( 2 ( α − α)∆)(D2)
2 > 0.
From the above expressions, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for D1 > 0







and for D2 > 0i sα >g (α) ≡ 2α− 1
2(1− 1
r),
with r ≡ ∆/c2.
• When α ≤ f(α), D1 =0a n dﬁrm 2 covers the entire market at price
p2 =( 1− 2α)∆ >c 2, according to its reaction function.14





















(1 − 2α)∆ = c2.A s
∂p2




13• Similarly, when α ≤ g(α), D2 =0a n dﬁrm 1 covers the entire market with
p1 =( 2 α − 1)∆ + c2 > 0.15




(2α − 1)∆ + c2 =0 .A s
∂p1
∂α > 0, then p1 > 0 for all α > 1
2(α + 1
2 − c2
2∆).
14